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TRADING STAMPS
NEWELL A. CLAPP*
In the nearly 66 years since the origin of the trading stamp plan,
the stamp business has become a force in merchandising. The
system, sometimes the subject of legal controversy, is now estab-
lished as one of the basic competitive devices used by retailers.'
Trading stamps have been defined "as those 'little pieces of
gummed paper' issued by retailers to customers who in turn accumu-
late them in sufficient quantities to exchange for an item of value."2
They were first issued in 1891 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, by Schuster's
Department Store. In 1896 The Sperry and Hutchinson Company
was organized as an independent trading stamp company and began
to make a stamp service available to a group of retailers in New
England, who in turn gave the stamps to their customers as purchases
were made. As stamp books were filled, they were redeemable for
merchandise supplied by the stamp company. The success of the plan
brought about a rapid increase in the number of retailers using stamps
and also in the number of stamp companies issuing them.'
Trading stamp companies have enjoyed their greatest growth since
World War II, especially since 1953. It was during the 1950's that
food supermarkets began using trading stamps on a very large scale.
As of 1958, it has been estimated that forty to fifty per cent of retail
food sales were made through supermarkets using trading stamps.'
In mid-1957, there were approximately 200 trading stamp com-
panies.' A trading stamp company has been defined as "an organiza-
tion set up solely to distribute trading stamps to all types of retailers
and offering a plan by whch stamps may be redeemed."' An estimated
one-fourth million retail outlets (all types), located in all the then
forty-eight states, were issuing trading stamps as of January, 1957.7
* Member of the law firm of Morison, Murphy, Clapp & Abrams, Washington,
D. C. The writer wishes to acknowledge, with appreciation, the contributions made
by his partners, Samuel K. Abrams and George B. Haddock.
1 Haring & Yoder, Trading Stamp Practice and Pricing Policy 3 (Bureau of Business
Research, Indiana University, 1958). This is a leading study of the industry and is
hereinafter referred to as RARING & YODER.
2 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Trading Stamps and Their Impact on Food
Prices 1, note 1 (1958). (Marketing Research Report No. 295).
3 HARING & YODER, 4.
4 Id. at 6-8.
G U.S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2. For other statements
as to the number of stamp companies, see Vredenburg, Trading Stamps 33-35 (Bureau
of Business Research, Indiana University, 1956); RARING & YODER, 19.
6 U.S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2, n. 4.
7 Supra note 4. Kansas later prohibited their issue.
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During 1956, the stamp companies maintained some 1,400-1,600
redemption centers in the United States' and in 1957 were estimated
as doing a one-half billion dollar business. 9 Available data indicate
that approximately two-thirds of American families were saving
stamps in 1958.10
As the foregoing statistics show, trading stamps are now an
important aspect of modern retailing. They are essentially a pro-
motional device in a highly competitive field; as such, their use has
generated a considerable amount of controversy. 1
THE STATUS OF TRADING STAMPS UNDER STATE LAWS
In the early part of this century, attempts were made in various
states to apply their "gift enterprise" laws to trading stamps. These
laws were directed against numerous types of lotteries and gambling
and were uniformly held to have no application to the issuance of
trading stamps, because no element of chance was involved,'" except
in those instances where the act specifically included a prohibition
against the giving of any article or thing in connection with the
purchase of any other product. In these latter cases, the laws were
generally held to be unconstitutional insofar as they applied to trading
stamps.13  Legislation which imposed prohibitive taxes on trading
stamp companies and stamp-issuing retailers has also been held to
be unconstitutional.' 4
8 Supra note 5.
9 HARING & YODER, 19-20. But see U.S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 31-32, where the estimate made is somewhat smaller for 1956.
10 HARING & YODER, 12. Dr. Charles F. Phillips, President, Bates College, in
testifying before the Subcommittee on Consumers Study of the House Committee on
Agriculture, in New York City on October 9, 1957, stated that "trading stamps are now
saved by at least half of all our families."
11 HARING & YODER, 299.
12 State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86, 35 So. 28 (1903); Tumlin Bros. Co. v. Daniel Bros.
Co., 141 Ga. 613, 81 S.E. 793 (1914); Commonweath v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 578, 60 N.E.
385 (1901); City of Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 47 S.E. 457 (1904).
13 City of Denver v. Frueauff, 39 Colo. 20, 88 Pac. 389 (1907); People v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917); State v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co.,
110 Minn. 378, 126 N.W. 120 (1910); State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 94 Neb. 785,
144 N.W. 795 (1913); Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E. 327 (1903).
Contra, Lansburgh v. The District of Columbia, 11 App. D.C. 512 (1897); Humes v.
City of Fort Smith, 93 Fed. 857 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1899).
14 See, e.g., State v. Lothrops-Farnham Co., 84 N.H. 322, 150 At. 551 (1930).
Among the cases holding that attempts to prohibit or unduly interfere with the issuance
of trading stamps are unconstitutional under the state constitutions involved, see, e.g.,
Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 S.W. 14 (1923); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940); People v. Victor,
287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939).
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The rather recent Iowa case of Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Hoegh1' sets out at some length the majority view on attempts to
prohibit the use of trading stamps. The provisions of the state "gift
enterprise" statute there involved included as a prohibited "gift" the
issuance of trading stamps redeemable by a stamp company, instead
of by the retailer himself. This prohibition was held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of Iowa, because the act, in the court's
opinion, violated the state constitutional provision requiring that a
law must operate "alike upon all within a reasonable classification."
"During the past half-century," said the court, "many states
have enacted laws similar to our gift enterprise statutes." The court
was convinced by its study of the cases "that the overwhelming weight
of authority is that such statutes as ours are unconstitutional as not
being within the sphere of police power." Citing numerous cases in
support, the court observed that "courts have quite generally held that
antitrading stamp legislation is unconstitutional as not a proper
exercise of police power." The decisions in the cited cases, said the
court, were generally based on the broad ground that:
[Alntitrading stamp laws constitute unnecessary restrictions on
the right of contract; unwarranted interference with a natural
right to attract custom; prohibit contractual relations which do not
affect the public health or morals or welfare; and are not the proper
exercise of police powers.
Referring to the United States Supreme Court cases of Rast v.
Van Deman & Lewis Co.,'" Tanner v. Little, " and Pitney v. State of
Washington,' all decided in 1916, and which in general held that
state "legislation relative to coupons and stamps is not unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution," the court pointed out that "a reading of the cases first
cited in this division [of its opinion] will show that the majority of
state court opinions since the Rast case, refuse to follow the reasoning
of the federal cases."
"In our judgment," continued the court, "the great weight of
authority and the better reasoning support the view that legislation
which practically prohibits the use of trading stamps is not a con-
stitutional exercise of the police power," admitting, however, that for
the purpose of the case, it did not have to decide whether the legisla-
ture could constitutionally prohibit the issuance of trading stamps.
15 246 Iowa 9, 65 NAV.2d 410 (1954). For a recent expression of the minority view
on the basic question by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, see Steffey v. City of
Casper, 357 P.2d 456 (1960); on rehearing, 358 P.2d 951 (1961).
16 240 U.S. 342 (1916).
17 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
18 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Iowa statute is illustrative of the antitrading stamp laws
which have been enacted from time to time by state legislatures since
retailers began to use this competitive device.
An important aspect of the attack on trading stamps is the con-
tention that their issuance with the sale of a "fair traded" item at the
"fair trade" price constitutes an unlawful price reduction. Since
numerous states have fair trade laws which generally permit resale
price maintenance of trade-marked commodities,' the issue has
frequently been before the courts. It was first passed on in Bristol-
Myers Co. v. Lit Bros. by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 19390
There it was contended by the plaintiff that the issuance of trading
stamps by the defendant resulted in a reduction of the price below that
fixed by plaintiff under the state's price maintenance law ("Fair Trade
Act"). This argument was rejected by the court, which held that the
issuance of trading stamps with merchandise sold at the "fair trade"
minimum price was not a violation of the act.
A similar result was reached in the California case of Weco
Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores2 There it was held
that trading stamps were a discount for prompt payment and not a
deduction from the purchase price; that "the giving of trading stamps
...does not effect a reduction in the price of the articles sold such
as to constitute a violation of the Fair Trade Act."'22
A contrary result is suggested in Bristol-Myers v. Picker, decided
in 1950 by the New York Court of Appeals. 3 There it was held that
cash register receipts redeemable in merchandise, when issued in con-
nection with "fair traded" articles sold at the minimum prices fixed by
the manufacturer, were in violation of that state's price maintenance
law 4
The more prevalent view, with some decisions to the contrary,
would seem to be that the use of trading stamps does not illegally
19 Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
150-152 (1955).
20 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939). This was followed in Gever v. American Stores
Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956).
21 55 Cal. App.2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942).
22 Accord, Coming Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 102 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569
(1960) where the New Hampshire Supreme Court held in part: "In practical effect, the
giving of stamps comes to no -more than a normal cash discount, which has never been
regarded as an unfair practice any'more than the extension of credit. . . . The practices
may be equated to the offering of free delivery or free parking."
23 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
24 In Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 221, 148 N.E.2d 861




affect the fair trade price and hence there is no violation of the
pertinent state statute when they are issued in connection with a
fair trade sale at the permitted minimum price.25
A somewhat similar problem with reference to the issuance of
trading stamps has arisen under the "Unfair Practices Acts," often
called "sales-below-cost" acts. These acts generally prohibit retail
sales below a certain price which represents a theoretical "cost"
determined according to specific formulae.
In Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Association,26
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, after a review of the authorities, held
that "the giving of such [trading] stamps did not constitute a price
cut or unfair competition, but that such stamps merely constituted
a discount for cash"; hence there was no violation of the state's
Unfair Sales Act . 7
The question has arisen in New Jersey as to whether the issuance
of trading stamps in connection with the retail sale of gasoline has
the effect of reducing the required posted price. In Sperry and
Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts,8 the New Jersey court held there was
no such effect and pointed out that "plaintiff's 'cooperative discount
system' is in aid of what has come to be the normal cash discount and
the only practical means to that end where there are intermittent
purchases in small lots." It concluded that such a "cash discount
is a term of payment merely, not a price adjustment; it is a mode of
financing, not a reduction in price," and hence did not violate that
state's Motor Fuel Act.
Thus, as regards trading stamps and the various "Unfair Prac-
tices Acts," including the "Motor Fuel Act" mentioned, the reported
cases to date are unanimous in holding that the use of such stamps
does not reduce the statutorily-defined minimum price at which goods
can legally be sold.
Mention should be made of the Oregon case of Sperry &
25 For a collection of the reported cases on the issue of trading stamps under fair
trade acts see Annot., 22 ALR 2d 1212 (1952), ALR 2d Supp. Service 1933 (1960),
ALR 2d Supp. Service 141 (1961).
26 322 P.2d 179 (1957), afi'd, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
27 Accord, Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942);
Trade Commission v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953).
For a collection of the reported cases on the issue of trading stamps under unfair
sales acts, see Annot., 70 ALR 2d 1080 (1960). As there stated, the courts which "have
been called upon to pass on this question have uniformly answered it in the negative
[that is, the issuance of trading stamps does not violate the unfair sales acts]. It should
be noted, however, that there are no reported cases from many jurisdictions which have
enacted unfair sales acts."
28 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
1962]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson,29 where it was held that trading stamps
were not in the nature of securities, and hence not subject to the
state's "blue sky" law, but, instead, were essentially a cash discount
device.
The result today is that, in all the states but one, trading stamps
are used as a legitimate and fair method of competition."0
TREATMENT OF TRADING STAMPS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
There are no adjudications as to the legality or illegality of
trading stamps under federal law. However, various agencies and
departments of the United States Government have from time to
time had occasion to consider this competitive device and their con-
clusions are of interest here.
A few years ago the Federal Trade Commission conducted an
investigation of the trading stamp industry, including the operations
and business methods of a number of the trading stamp companies.
The basic purpose of the Commission was to determine whether the
use of trading stamps was an unfair method of competition or an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 On October 3, 1957, the
Commission issued a press release, the opening paragraph of which
was as follows:
The Federal Trade Commission announced today that it did not
consider trading stamp plans in themselves to be an unfair method
of competition under the laws it administers, and concluded not
to issue any complaints at this time prohibiting the use of trading
stamps.
In the course of its release, the FTC referred to Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and said:
This section has been construed by the courts to confer a broad
29 190 Ore. 458, 226 P.2d 501 (1951).
30 "Trading stamps are now used in every State except Kansas, where they are
prohibited. In Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming stamps may be redeemed only for
cash. Fifteen States require that stamps be redeemable in cash or merchandise at the
option of the purchaser. Ten States require that trading stamp companies be bonded."
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, Report No. 866, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Sept. 1, 1961). Also, the use of trading stamps is now permitted in the District of
Columbia, infra note 36.
In 1961, Montana enacted a law imposing a prohibitive license tax on the issuance
of trading stamps, to go into effect June 30, 1962. Ch. 153, Montana Session Laws of
1961. A case testing the constitutionality of this law is presently pending before the
District Court for the First judicial District of Montana (Garden Spot Market v.
Byrne, No. 28502).
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a). This section makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
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discretion on the Commission in its initial determination of what
is an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in commerce. However, the Commission recognizes
that this discretion must be exercised within established principles
of law and in situations where the unfavorable impact upon com-
merce must be definitely revealed.
32
There is one reported case involving the Sherman Act in which
the allegations of antitrust violations related directly to the issuance
of trading stamps. In United States v. Gasoline Retailers Associ-,
ation,33 it was held that an agreement between competing gasoline
retailers and a labor union prohibiting, inter alia, the giving of pre-
miums, including trading stamps, in connection with retail gasoline
sales was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Reference has already been made to the 1958 study of trading
stamps by the United States Department of Agriculture.3 4 As pointed
out in its report, the question of who actually bears the cost of
trading stamps "is one of the most controversial issues in the history
of food retailing.' 35 Based on its study of this question, the Depart-
ment came to the conclusion that:
Consumers are interested in trading stamps for other reasons than
the effect on retail prices. They also are interested in what they
can expect in return for accumulating stamps. In a previous pub-
lication by the Department, it was pointed out that the merchandise
which the consumer receives by redeeming stamps is about 2.0
per cent of the purchase dollars required to fill a stamp book and
may range from 1-2/3 to 2-1/2 per cent, depending on pricing
policies of stores from which a similar article could be purchased.
This study indicates that average prices paid by consumers in
stamp stores increased 0.6 per cent more than in non-stamp stores
-a difference equal to about 30 per cent of the average merchan-
dise value of stamps.3
6
32 The concept of "unfair methods of competition" is a flexible one "to be defined
with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business." It not only includes
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts but also incipient "acts and practices which,
when full blown, would violate those Acts." Federal Trade Commission v. Motion
Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953). To this concept there
was added (by an amendment in 1938) that of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce." This enabled the Commission to prevent or stop such acts "which
injuriously affected the public interest alone, while under the original Act the Commis-
sion's power to safeguard the public against unfair trade practices depended upon whether
the objectionable acts or practices affected competition." Scientific Mfg. Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 124 F.2d 640, 642-644 (3d Cir. 1941).
33 1960 Trade Cases ff 69,596 (N.D. Ind. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).
34 Supra note 2.
35 U. S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1.
36 Id. at 28. For another study of the differences between food prices at stamp and
non-stamp stores, see HARING & YODER, 225-296. "The charge that adoption of
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In 1958, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a re-
lease37 in which it expressed the view that trading stamps redeemable
in cash or merchandise are not securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act of 1933.
The Department of Commerce in 1956 issued a bulletin on
trading stamps. 3 It was prepared, as stated, "primarily to assist the
smaller businessman in weighing the advantages and disadvantages
of adopting a stamp plan for his store." The bulletin discusses, inter
alia, how trading stamp plans work, the scope of the trading stamp
business, and the advantages and disadvantages of using this com-
petitive device. Under the heading of "Which Plan Should You
Choose?" the bulletin pointed out that if a businessman decides to
use such a promotional tool he should, among other things, "have
definite assurance of an exclusive franchise on a continuing basis
for your kind of store in your trading area."
It is this "exclusive franchise" that should be examined in light
of the federal antitrust laws.39 However, it is appropriate to observe
here that obviously the various agencies of the Federal Government
which have expressed themselves to date see nothing illegal or other-
wise offensive in trading stamp plans as such.
THE LEGALITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW OF EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISES
AS USED IN THE TRADING STAMP INDUSTRY
Most trading stamp plans provide for giving an exclusive license
for a particular area to one of each type of retailer. A stamp company
stamps will raise the level of prices in a store or even in a community appears to be
completely unsubstantiated." HARING & YODER, 225.
In the course of its report, the Department of Agriculture pointed out, inter alia,
that "the legal status of trading stamps is primarily in the hands of the States" (p. 15) ;
that "with few exceptions, the courts have held that trading stamps represent a discount
and therefore do not violate the retail price maintenance laws," which include fair
trade acts, as well as unfair sales and motor fuel acts (p. 12); and that, pertaining to
"the gift enterprise statutes that exist in many States," most of the decisions "have been
favorable to trading stamps, on the grounds that trading stamp plans are not subjected
to an element of chance or lot and therefore cannot be classified under the gift enter-
prise statutes (p. 13)."
The chief exception to this last statement with respect to gift enterprise statutes, as
pointed out in the report (p. 13), is the statute in the District of Columbia, which, as
stated, "goes beyond most laws of this nature" and which has been interpreted as barring
the use of trading stamps there. This was true in 1958; however, in 1961 Congress
repealed this law, thus removing all prohibitions against the use of trading stamps in the
District of Columbia. P.L. 87-267, 75 Stat. 565, approved Sept. 21, 1961.
37 Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3890, Jan. 21, 1958.
38 Summary of Information on Trading Stamps, Business Service Bulletin, BSB-182,
Sept. 1956.
39 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-27, 45(a).
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will group retail merchants into classes according to the principal
type of business done, such as grocery stores, drug stores, and
laundries. One retailer -of each class in a defined market area is
licensed to distribute to its customers the stamps of the licensing stamp
company. The company agrees, formally or informally, that it will
not license or permit any other competing retailer of that class to
issue its stamps in the specified area. To the extent, of course, that
different types of retailer-licensees overlap in the kinds of mer-
chandise sold, such as, for example, cosmetics, they are competitors of
each other, although they do not compete as to their primary lines of
business. It has been pointed out that this "exclusive franchise for
each kind of retailer in a market is basic to all types of stamp plans";
that this feature "is essential because the trading stamp's greatest
asset is its ability to direct consumer demand to a particular store."4
A competitor in the particular market may, of course, "offer a
different stamp,4 1 lower prices, 42 increase services, have 'prize draw-
ings,' or use other devices to counteract stamp-store competition. 4 3
In considering exclusive franchises, it is important to bear in
mind that they are a form of exclusive representation, which is to be
distinguished from exclusive dealing. In exclusive dealing, the buyer
enters into an arrangement by which he agrees to handle the product
of one seller only. In exclusive representation, the seller enters into
an arrangement by which he agrees to sell to only one buyer in a par-
ticular area or, as in trading stamps, to a single buyer engaged in a
particular type of business in a particular area. "Exclusive dealing"
agreements, so far as is known, are not generally used in the trading
stamp industry and, accordingly, are not within the scope of this
discussion.
Most, if not all, of the case law dealing with exclusive dis-
tribution rights involves the sale or distribution of a commodity and
with the impact on competition in the business of selling that com-
modity. The trading stamp business does not involve the sale by stamp
companies of a commodity for resale by retailers; the transaction
40 HARING & YODER, 22. See supra note 1 at 22, where the authors refer to two
stamp plans that are offered to "each and every store in a community." It is pointed
out that "obviously, the customer is not tied to a particular store, brand, or chain by this
policy. This is competitive retaliation to minimize the patronage pull of regular trading
stamps. From the point of view of this [the authors'] presentation, ... [such stamps]
are 'stamps' but not bona fide 'trading stamps' ... ."
41 In mid-1957, there were approximately 200 trading stamp companies. Supra note
5 and accompanying text.
42 "Nonstamp stores regularly use price reductions and specials to combat stamp-
store competition." HARING & YODER, 304.
43 HARING & YODER, 22, supra note 1.
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is in the nature of a sale to retail merchants of a promotional service'
in aid of their business of selling goods and services.
Two different areas of commercial activity should be considered
in appraising the legality of the franchise agreements used in the
trading stamp industry.45 One area is competition in the trading stamp
business itself; the other is competition among the retailers in a par-
ticular line of business, such as in the retail sale of groceries.
The principle is well established that an individual seller has a
right to select customers of its own choice and to refuse to sell to
others, and the exercise of this right, without more, is not a violation
of the antitrust laws. Exclusive franchise agreements between sellers
and buyers, pursuant to which the seller selects a particular customer
to handle its goods on an exclusive basis in a defined area, have been
regarded as being per se legal so long as they are not used by one
who is in a monopoly position, i.e., where there is no effective com-
petition at either the seller or buyer level.4 6 Of course, this right to
enter into exclusive selling arrangements cannot be exercised as part
of a scheme to violate the antitrust laws, 47 e.g., to fix prices or to
boycott.
The Sherman Act
The value of any particular trading stamp to a retailer is measured
in terms of the advantage he gains in attracting new customers, in
retaining those he already has, or probably both. In the view of the
trading stamp companies, it is important that licenses be confined to
non-competing retailers in a given market area, "because the trading
stamp's greatest asset is its ability to direct consumer demand to a
particular store." This is not possible if the stamp plan is offered
44 The tying arrangements proscribed by section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A.
§ 14) relate only to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities." This section, of course, relates solely to "exclusive dealing."
45 These franchise agreements probably should be characterized as "semi-exclusive";
although they are exclusive for the licensee's competitors in a market area, they are
not exclusive for the non-competing retailers in the area.
46 Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951); Schwing Motor Co. v.
Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 902-903 (Md. 1956), aff'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th
Cir. 1956).
"When an exclusive dealership 'is not part and parcel of a scheme to monopolize and
effective competition exists at both the seller and buyer levels, the arrangement has
invariably been upheld as a reasonable restraint of trade. In short, the rule was virtually
one of per se legality' . . . ." Packard Motor Co., Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d
418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
47 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 45(a). As to § 45(a) (i.e., § 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act), see note 32, supra. Because of the facts and the nature of the question




to "each and every store in a community." This conclusion is not
affected by the fact that under certain circumstances a trading stamp
company may see fit to offer its stamps to competing retailers.4  It
would thus seem clear that the use of the exclusive franchise by trading
stamp companies "springs from business requirements" and not from
any "purpose to monopolize" the trading stamp business.49
Section 2 of the Sherman ActO° outlaws monopolization and
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate com-
merce. From all the known facts, previously mentioned and discussed,
it would seem clear that no problem as to the legality of the exclusive
franchise used by the trading stamp companies would arise under this
section." As the Supreme Court said in Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States:1
2
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. (Emphasis by the Court.)
Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws conspiracies and agreements
in unreasonable restraint of trade. 3 Any conspiracy or agreement
to suppress or eliminate price competition is per se an unreasonable
restraint and, if the purpose or effect of exclusive selling agreements
is to obtain this result, the agreements would be illegal under this
section, without proof of any injury to competition. 4 The "semi-
exclusive" franchise system in and of itself would not have any anti-
competitive effect on the prices charged by the trading stamp companies
for the use of their service or on the prices charged by the retailers
for the goods or services sold by them. In neither area can it be said
that the franchise, as such, has an unreasonable effect on price com-
petition.
"Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with
48 HARING & YODER, 22, supra note 1.
49 See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953).
50 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
51 As a matter of fact, the exclusive franchise system would appear to be antithetical
to an attempt to monopolize or to the achievement of a monopoly by a company
which uses such a system of distribution. In limiting its sales to a single buyer within
a particular area, such a company is deliberately leaving to its competitors the balance
of the market.
52 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
53 Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Report of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 5-10 (1955).
54 United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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other traders," are per se illegal. Such a boycott, however, is to be
distinguished from the situation where a manufacturer and a dealer
agree to an exclusive distributorship, 5 the legality of which has been
upheld in numerous decisions.56 In the Packard Motor Car case, 7
for example, it was held as a matter of law that an agreement estab-
lishing an exclusive distributorship for one brand of automobile was
per se legal, even though the effect was to eliminate other area dealers
in the same product-"it is the essential nature of the arrangement.""8
A fortiori, the "semi-exclusive" franchises used by the trading
stamp companies are equally valid. In the use of the franchise system,
the trading stamp companies are not following any pattern or practice of
refusing to deal with any particular merchants or group of merchants;
there are no "concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,"
to use the language of the Supreme Court. 9 The licensees of a
particular company are not substantial competitors by the very
nature of the exclusive licensing system used, and no licensee of
any company would have any interest in whether any other licensee
of the same company is granted an exclusive franchise for a given
market area. The most that can be said is that each exclusive licensee
55 Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
56 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953); Schwing
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (Md. 1956), aff'd, 239 F.2d 176
(4th Cir. 1956); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 397, 398-399
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd on this point by an equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707,
718-719 (1944). (In this connection, it should be noted that tied to the exclusive sales
agreement between Bausch & Lomb and its sole customer of the product involved was
the agreement by the manufacturer not to compete with its customer in the marketing
of the product. See 321 U.S. 718-719.)
For a discussion of this issue and the numerous pertinent cases, see Robinson,
"Providing For Orderly Marketing of Goods," 15 A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law
282, 283-290 (August 1959); also, for an earlier discussion of the issue, see Rifkind,
"Division of Territories," in How To Comply With The Antitrust Laws 127, 135-137
(Van Cise & Dunn, editors, Commerce Clearing House, 1954).
57 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
58 In United States v. White Motor Company, 194 F. Supp. 562, 578 (N.D. Ohio,
1961), the court pointed out that "agreements by a manufacturer with its distributors or
dealers that the manufacturer will not sell to any others or to others within their
respective 'exclusive territories' . . . have been upheld as reasonable when ancillary to
the sale of goods for resale . ... " Such agreements were distinguished from those
whereby the distributors and dealers agree with the manufacturer "that they will not
sell to purchasers located outside their respective assigned 'exclusive territories.'" This
latter type of agreement is not involved here, as a stamp licensee is free to sell to any
and all customers, regardless of where they are located, and to issue trading stamps in
connection with such sales.
59 Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, supra note 55.
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does not want his competitors in his territory to be licensed at all
by his stamp company, but in this he is no different than the holder
of any other exclusive franchise. Thus the legality of his contract is
as firm as the legality of the contracts involved in the exclusive dis-
tributorship cases already mentioned."
The criteria that have been developed by the courts under the
Sherman Act with respect to exclusive selling arrangements can be
rather simply stated. A seller having a monopoly may not restrict
its sales to one or a few favored customers.0 Absent such a monopoly,
the rule as to exclusive selling is "virtually one of per se legality"
and "the arrangement has invariably been upheld as. a reasonable
restraint of trade."" However, if the exclusive selling arrangement,
as carried out in a given situation, is merely serving as an instrument
for unduly restraining trade, it would run afoul of the Sherman Act . 3
As has been pointed out, in regard to exclusive distributing
arrangements, "it can be said with some certainty that the antitrust
laws do not stand in the way of a normal and reasonable restriction
on competition. The rule of reason operates here in full sway."6 4
The Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws "un-
fair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce.",
As used in the act, "unfair methods of competition" are not con-
fined to those that were illegal at common law or proscribed by the
Sherman Act. The concept is a flexible one, "to be defined with par-
ticularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business." More-
over, the Federal Trade Commission Act "was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . . . to stop
in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would
violate those Acts . . . , as well as to condemn as 'unfair method
of competition' existing violations of them."6 In 1920, in the Gratz
case, the Supreme Court had pointed out that the concept was "clearly
inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to
60 Supra note 56.
61 Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953);
Robinson, op. cit. supra note 56, at 285-286.
62 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Robinson, op. cit. supra note 56, at 286.
63 Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., supra note 61, at 335.
64 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 56, at 290.
65 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a). See, in this connection, supra note 32.
66 Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344
U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953) ; see note 32, supra.
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good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or
oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly."67 In-
cluded among the practices which have been held to be violations of
this section are deceptive labeling or representations,", the use of a
lottery device in selling,69 and the use of exclusive dealing contracts
in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.70
There is no likelihood that the franchise system used by the
trading stamp companies would be found to come within the ambit
of such violations as these. The Commission's release of October 3,
1957, is certainly to this effect, to say the least.7
The practice of an individual manufacturer in refusing to deal,
or in dealing with certain buyers only, has been held to be a violation
of this section when its purpose and intent were to control resale
prices and where the accompanying activities of the seller and the
favored customers had a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or to create monopoly" and enabled the manufacturer "to
prevent competition ... [in the resale of its products] by preventing
all who do not sell at resale prices fixed by it from obtaining its
goods." 72
67 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427-428 (1920).
68 Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
69 Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
70 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1940). As already mentioned, the provisions of the Clayton Act are not pertinent to this
discussion. See supra note 47.
71 Supra notes 31, 32, and accompanying text.
72 Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454, 455
(1922).
In the recent case of Snap-On Tools Corporation, FTC Docket No. 7116, decided
Nov. 1, 1961, the company distributed most of its products through a system of
franchised dealers, each of whom was required to agree that it would not sell outside
its assigned territory, would adhere to resale prices fixed by the company and, in
the event of the termination of the franchise agreement, would refrain for one year
from carrying on a similar business within the state or states in which it had been
operating. In some instances, the company imposed restrictions as to the customers to
whom a dealer could sell. The Commission's view was "that all of the practices com-
plained of should be considered as related and component parts of an entire course of
dealing" and it stated that its inquiry was "not whether a particular restraint upon an
individual distributor is illegal per se, but rather whether all of the restraints imposed
upon all of respondent's dealers suppressed competition in the distribution of its
products." The Commission, in ordering these practices stopped, did not interfere with
the company's system of franchised dealers as such and pointed out that the exclusive
franchises involved in the Schwing and Webster cases (supra note 56) were an entirely
different situation "where the manufacturer agreed to sell to no other dealer in a
designated area. No restraint upon the dealer was involved."
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The purpose of the Sherman Act (and the Clayton Act) is not
to protect the individual traders engaged in commerce against injury,
but is rather to protect the public interest by banning activities which
have the necessary result of unreasonably restraining trade. "Anti-
trust legislation is concerned primarily with the health of the com-
petitive process, not with the individual competitor who must sink
or swim in competitive enterprise." 73 Another way of expressing this
principle is that the conduct charged to be illegal must be "reasonably
calculated to prejudice the public interest by unduly restricting the
free flow of interstate commerce. '74
[However], if the necessary effect of a combination to engage in
or conduct interstate . . . commerce is but incidentally and in-
directly to restrict competition therein, while its chief result is
to foster the trade and to increase the business of those who make
and operate it, it does not fall under the ban of this [antitrust]
law.75
Decisions relating to the application of Section 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to activities involving restraints of
trade are not substantially different. Not every restraint of trade is
an unfair method of competition. When the particular practice under
consideration is not per se illegal under the antitrust laws, and there
is no specific purpose or intent to accomplish a result banned by
them, it is necessary to determine whether the practice would neces-
sarily result, or "when full blown" would so result, in an undue and
unreasonable restraint of trade, or monopolization, prohibited by the
Sherman Act.76
The purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act (and the
Sherman Act) is to preserve active competition in an industry and to
73 Anheuser-Busch v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (1961).
When acts are found to have the prohibited result, it is unnecessary to find a specific
intent to accomplish that purpose. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-106
(1948).
74 Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 903 (Md. 1956),
aff'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956). See Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207
(1959).
75 Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1946).
76 Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S.
392 (1953); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923),
with respect to which, see Dictograph Products v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d
821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954).
The fact that a given method of competition may make it difficult for competitors
to do business successfully is not of itself sufficient to brand the method of competition
as unlawful or unfair. Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568, 582
(1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 157
(2d Cir. 1932).
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encourage, not to prevent or discourage, individual competitors active-
ly to seek competitive advantages. Competition has been defined as
a "conflict for advantage" and the "play of the contending forces
ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain," and the Com-
mission has no authority "to interfere with ordinary business methods"
chosen by competitors in striving for such advantage or "to prescribe
arbitrary standards" or "to compel competitors to a common level."7
7
As regards monopoly, the general rule is to the effect that, if
a seller has a monopoly in any line of commerce, he cannot lawfully
confer a part of that monopoly on a buyer through an exclusive selling
arrangement. 78 Although every producer has "a natural and complete
monopoly" of the particular product it makes, this is not the kind
of monopoly power condemned by the antitrust laws; the proscribed
monopoly has to do with all the products which constitute a line
of commerce.7 9
[The] power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufac-
turers have over their trademarked products is not the power that
makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in
terms of the competitive market for the product. Determination
of the competitive market for commodities depends on how differ-
ent from one another are the offered commodities in character
or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one commodity for
another.80
This principle has been applied to exclusive selling arrangements,
or refusals to sell, by a producer of washing machines, 1 optical
goods,82 automobiles, 3 and by distributors of motion picture films.84
In each of these cases, it was held that where the seller did not have
monopoly power over the kind of products involved, its practice of
selling exclusively to certain buyers and in refusing to sell to others
was not illegal. 85
77 Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-476 (1923).
78 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 56, at 285-287.
79 Id. at 287; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., supra note 56.
80 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
81 Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953).
82 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398-399 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), aff'd on this point by an equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707, 718-719 (1944).
See supra note 56.
83 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales ,Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (Md. 1956), aff'd,
239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
84 G & P Amusement Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 107 F. Supp. 453 (NJ). Ohio, 1952),
aff'd, 216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954); Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-
Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1932).
85 See supra notes 56, 57, 58, and accompanying text. But see, Hershey Chocolate
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The Trading Stamp Franchise
The exclusive franchise system as used in the trading stamp
industry has no effect or tendency of precluding any stamp company
from access to the market, or any part of it. By adopting the system,
a company limits the number of retailers with whom it deals, thereby
leaving all competing non-licensed retailers available to its competitors.
Indeed, once a stamp company enters an area on an exclusive basis,
the retailers competing with its licensees may well be stimulated to
"take on" competing stamps. Moreover, the exclusive licensee is
no more precluded from using other competing stamps than he would
be if his license were non-exclusive. In either case, the decision by
a retailer as to whether he should use more than one stamp service
would be a business one and not one governed by the presence or
absence of the exclusivity feature of his license. Thus, the exclusive
dealing cases, as already pointed out, have no relevance.
This exclusive aspect of a license from a particular stamp com-
pany might well be considered by a retailer to have such value to him
that he would prefer to use the stamps of that company rather than
those of another. This result, however, would not cause the franchise
system to run afoul of the antitrust laws. The exclusive distribu-
torship cases, previously discussed, make this clear. There would
appear to be active competition among the numerous trading stamp
companies in the country.86 The exclusive license used by most of
them has not had any discernible effect of reducing this competition.
Furthermore, there is no restraint on competition in the distribution
of trading stamps by merchants at the retail level, because there
is no trade and commerce in trading stamps at that level and, con-
sequently, there is no such competition that could be affected. Retailers
do not sell trading stamps any more than they sell advertising in
newspapers; they simply use them as merchandising aids.
Conceivably, however, it might be argued that there is some kind
of injury to the public by conferring upon certain retailers a "monop-
oly" in the distribution of a particular trading stamp in a given area.
There are at least two answers to any such possible argument. One
is that no retailer is given a "monopoly ' 87 in any area. The trading
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941). There the two
leading makers of chocolate bars made separate exclusive selling arrangements with the
three largest operators of vending machines, thus eliminating sales to many other
operators. It was held that these exclusive arrangements were an unfair method
of competition. The case is probably distinguishable from the others on the ground that
the court considered the arrangements to constitute a group boycott, thus bringing it
within the rule of the Kor's case, supra note 55.
86 See HARING & YODER, 4-9, 19-20; infra note 87.
87 The basic question is posed as to whether a stamp company can have a monopoly
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stamp company not only reserves the right but actively seeks to
license other non-competing retailers in the market area. Inability
of the public to secure a particular trading stamp from twenty-five
rather than five retailers in any given area does not create a situation
coming within the ambit of the antitrust laws.
Secondly, the many exclusive franchise cases decided by the courts
are in point. They have upheld such franchises as being entirely legal.
Certainly, if the giving of an exclusive license by an automobile
manufacturer to a dealer for a defined area is not in violation of
the antitrust laws, the granting of a "semi-exclusive" license to a
retailer in a given area by a trading stamp company is equally valid.
In neither case is there any injury to the public.
But what about the competition between retailers? Does the
exclusive license affect that competition in such fashion as to run
afoul of the antitrust laws? Any theory of illegality would seemingly
have to be based on the alleged fact that, because of the use of "semi-
exclusive" franchises, a merchant might be unable to secure a trading
stamp having a value, in terms of consumer acceptance or appeal,
equivalent to the stamp or stamps used by his competitors. This might
or might not handicap him in his ability to compete. With all the
other merchandising aids available to him, such as lower prices,
increased services and prize drawings, for example,88 any assumption
of a resulting handicap is highly speculative at best. However, even
if one assumes a competitive handicap in such a situation, this would
of trading stamps within the rationale of the Du Pont case, supra note 80. Does "the
line of commerce" include not only trading stamps but also all other substitutable
merchandising aids? "Monopolizing under Section 2 [of the Sherman Act] consists
of monopoly in the economic sense-that is, power to fix prices or to exclude competi-
tion-plus a carefully limited ingredient of purpose to use or preserve such power."
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 43
(1955). If it be assumed that trading stamps are "a line of commerce"-a questionable
assumption-and thus capable of being illegally monopolized, certain well-known facts
would seem to indicate quite definitely that no stamp company has such a monopoly.
There are approximately 200 trading stamp companies doing business in the United
States. In 1956, of 199 companies surveyed by the Department of Agriculture, 33 of
them had revenues of over a million dollars each. Total revenues for the industry more
than doubled from 1954 to 1956, due to growth within existing companies and because
of the formation of new companies, which was rapid during this period. Also in 1956,
about 70% of the trading stamp business was divided among the 10 largest companies.
U. S. Department of Agriculture, op. cit. supra notes 2, at 2-3; see supra, note 5 and
accompanying text.
The most that can be said as to each stamp company is that it has a "natural and
complete monopoly" of its own particular stamp service, but this is not the kind of
monopoly proscribed by the Sherman Act. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88 Supra notes 22, 40-43, and accompanying text.
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not make the exclusive franchise illegal. The antitrust laws are "con-
cerned primarily with the health of the competitive process, not with
the individual competitor who must sink or swim in competitive en-
terprise." 9 Concerning exclusive selling arrangements, the law does
not "stand in the way of a normal and reasonable restriction on com-
petition,""° and the cases make it clear that exclusive franchises do
not violate that standard.9 Indeed, in the usual situation where an
automobile dealer, for example, is unable to obtain the desired auto-
mobile because his competitor has secured an exclusive franchise, he
may well be unable to secure any substitute and thus be unable to
continue in business. In the case of trading stamps, however, inability
to obtain a desired stamp service in no way affects the retailer's ability
to obtain the goods he sells and, in addition, there are many other
merchandising aids available to him.
The decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture
Advertising Service Co? 2 is not applicable. The gravamen of the
offense there was the effective denial to competitors of access to the
greater part of a limited market by reason of the widespread use
of exclusive dealing contracts by the four leading producers, of which
the company was one. The franchise agreements used in the trading
stamp industry are not exclusive dealing contracts and thus do not
foreclose any part of the market to the competitors of any stamp
company nor do they foreclose to any retailer any portion of his
market. The most that can be said is that the effect of the use of such
a system by one or more stamp companies in a given market area is
89 Supra note 73 and accompanying text.
90 Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91 Supra note 56.
92 Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S.
392 (1953); supra note 66. This case may well be said to represent the "high water
mark" in interpreting the scope of the Sherman Act and of section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act with respect to the issue there involved. There it was held that,
because respondent and three other companies not parties to the proceeding had "tied up"
approximately 75% of the limited theater outlets for advertising films by the use of
exclusive dealing contracts, respondent's contracts were in violation of the Sherman
Act and hence were an "unfair method of competition" within the meaning of Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Such an "aggregate" rule had never before
been applied in this context, in the absence of a conspiracy or concerted action (see
opinion of the dissenting justices), and no subsequent case is known where this has
been done. In any event, such a rule would seem to have relevance only to exclusive
dealing arrangments, where the effect is to foreclose a market, or a major part of it,
to competitors of the seller.
It is of interest to note that the Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Commission
did not prohibit the company's use of exclusive dealing contracts; the prohibition was
only that each contract must not be for a longer term than one year.
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to make it impossible for competitors of the licensees to obtain any
of the stamps used by those having the exclusive licenses. This may
hurt them in the competitive struggle if the desired stamps are the
popular ones but, as already pointed out, it does not make the franchise
system illegal. There is nothing in the Motion Picture Advertising case
to the contrary.
No decision has ever intimated that the exclusive selling arrange-
ments of a leading manufacturer or distributor would be illegal if its
important competitors were using the same kind of system, with the
result that a dealer who could not secure a franchise from any of these
sellers was thereby deprived of the opportunity to buy and resell the
desired popular product and was thus hurt competitively. All the
cases upholding the legality of exclusive distributorships are in point.
A fortiori, inability of a retailer to obtain the use of any one of a
number of popular trading stamps, because he is not one of the
exclusive licensees, does not make the franchise system an unfair
method of competition or otherwise illegal.
CONCLUSION
Trading stamps are a competitive tool of widespread use. As
such they have generated much inevitable controversy. The general
charge against them is that they are "unfair competition." Yet they
are only one of a number of widely-used merchandising aids and
there is no basis in the federal law for branding their use an "unfair
method of competition." In all the states but one trading stamps
are used as a legitimate and fair method of competition. 3
As already mentioned, the Congress in the summer of 1961 re-
pealed the old gift enterprise law of the District of Columbia, which
had been interpreted to forbid the use of trading stamps, among other
things. In its report9 4 recommending repeal, the Senate Committee
on the District of Columbia said:
There seemed to be two arguments advanced against the use of
trading stamps. The first argument was to the effect that trading
stamps are an added cost for the retailer which must be passed on
to the consumer. It was the feeling of the committee that this
charge, if true, would have equal application to all of the other pro-
motional devices ...
The second objection to trading stamps was that the practice of
trading stamp companies of granting exclusive franchises to a
limited number of retailers constitutes an unfair business practice
since it deprives some retailers of an opportunity to use the trading
stamps of a particular company or companies.
93 See supra note 30.
94 Supra note 30.
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The exclusive franchise system is completely legal and is not
unique to the trading stamp industry. As a system of distribution
it is commonly used by automobile manufacturers, farm equipment
manufacturers, clothing companies, and small and large appliance
manufacturers, to name but a few of the many industries employing
the system.
With so many trading stamp companies in the market, a retailer
in the District of Columbia who desires a trading stamp plan,
should be able to obtain one. The fact that the exclusive franchise
system of a company might prevent a retailer from obtaining a
particular stamp plan, is no reason to single out this sales pro-
motion activity for special legislative treatment.
This statement and the subsequent action of the Congress in
passing the repeal bill would seem accurately to reflect the law with
respect to the exclusive franchise and its use by trading stamp
companies.
